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Goldberg 2016 is a collection of papers dedicated to Putnam’s (1981) 
brain in a vat (‘BIV’) scenario. The collection divides into three parts, 
though the issues are inter-connected. Putnam uses conceptual tools 
from philosophy of language in order to establish theses in epistemology 
and metaphysics. Putnam’s BIV is considered a contemporary version 
of Descartes’s skeptical argument of the Evil Genius, but I argue that 
deception (the possibility of having massively false belief) is not essen-
tial, externalism does all the anti-skeptical work. The largest section in 
the collection covers Putnam’s model-theoretic argument (MTA) against 
metaphysical realism (MR) and its connections with the brain in vat 
argument (BVA). There are two camps—unifi ers (there is a deep con-
nection in Putnam’s thoughts on BVA, MTA and MR) and patchwork 
theorists and I try to provide some support for the second camp. All of the 
papers in the collection are discussed and the anti-skeptical potential of 
BVA is critically assessed.
Keywords: Putnam, brain-in-a-vat scenario, skepticism, realism, 
model-theoretic argument.
It is not easy to track the provenance of the brain in a vat (‘BIV’ for 
short) scenario. The contemporary empirical source seems to be the 
work of Canadian neurosurgeon Wilder Graves Penfi eld on neural 
stimulations (in the 1930s) and experiments in waking human sub-
jects undergoing epilepsy surgery. Penfi eld observed quite complex 
memories being switched on by electrical stimulation of the appropri-
ate parts of the cerebral cortex (Tallis 2011: 36). Its philosophical use 
is (fi rst?) registered in the work of Gilbert Harman (1973)—a playful 
brain surgeon might be giving you “normal” experiences by stimulat-
ing your cortex in a special way, but in reality “you might really be 
stretched out on a table in his laboratory with wires running into your 
head from a large computer. Perhaps you have always been on that 
table. ... Or perhaps you do not even have a body. Maybe you were in 
an accident and all that could be saved was your brain, which is kept 
alive in the laboratory” (Harman 1973: 5). This type of scenario leads to 
206 D. Šuster, “The Brain in Vat” at the Intersection
familiar philosophical problems of other minds and the external world 
skepticism, evoked, famously by Descartes. Recall: “... some evil spirit, 
supremely powerful and cunning, has devoted all his efforts to deceiv-
ing me. ... What truth then is left? Perhaps this alone, that nothing is 
certain” (Descartes 2008: 16).
Nowadays the scenario is almost automatically associated with Hil-
ary Putnam (the fi rst chapter of his 1981). An entire new collection 
(Goldberg 2016 in the series on Classic Philosophical Arguments) is 
now dedicated solely to philosophical applications and ramifi cations of 
the version proposed by Putnam. Descartes is still in the background, 
thus Goldberg in Introduction (2016: 2) “Putnam’s refl ections on the 
BIV scenario have a familiar historical precedent, of course, in Des-
cartes’s refl ections on the Evil Demon scenario.” The connection with 
the Cartesian deceiver is not entirely accurate and I fi nd the proper 
role of deception to be controversial. Putnam actually writes: “Perhaps 
there is no evil scientist, perhaps (though this is absurd) the universe 
just happens to consist of automatic machinery tending a vat full of 
brains and nervous systems” (Putnam 1981: 6). In Putnam’s BIV world 
everyone is raised as brains in vats, but their perceptual input is quali-
tatively just like ours. Could this be our predicament? Putnam argues 
from some plausible assumptions about the nature of reference to the 
conclusion that it is not possible that all sentient creatures are brains 
in a vat. A deceivingly simple and enormously infl uential argument 
(‘BVA’ for short) in various fi elds of philosophy. The collection divides 
into three parts, though the issues are inter-connected. Putnam uses 
conceptual tools from philosophy of language in order to establish the-
ses in epistemology and metaphysics.
The fi rst part, “Intentionality and the philosophy of mind and lan-
guage” opens with an essay by Anthony Brueckner, one of the earliest 
commentators who wrote several papers on the argument. His seminal 
paper reconstructed the argument in terms of a disjunctive dilemma 
suggested by Putnam (Brueckner 1986: 154; more or less reproduced 
by Pritchard and Ranalli in Goldberg 2016: 78):
(1) Either I am a BIV (speaking vat-English) or I am a non-BIV 
(speaking English).
(2) If I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then my utterances of ‘I 
am a BIV’ are true iff I have sense impressions as of being a BIV.
(3) If I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then I do not have sense 
impressions as of being a BIV.
(4) If I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then my utterances of ‘I 
am a BIV’ are false. [(2), (3)]
(5) If I am a non-BIV (speaking English), then my utterances of ‘I 
am a BIV’ are true iff I am a BIV.
(6) If I am a non-BIV (speaking English), then my utterances of ‘I 
am a BIV’ are false. [(5)]
(7) My utterances of ‘I am a BIV’ are false. [(1), (4), (6)]
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Whatever proposition is expressed by my utterances of ‘I am a BIV’ is 
a false proposition. The anti-skeptical conclusion seems to be that I 
therefore know that I am not a BIV. The argument is based on an anal-
ysis of the truth conditions for the sentences uttered (or thought) by a 
BIV. These conditions depend on the assignments of references which 
one would make in evaluating the truth value of BIV’s utterances. Ac-
cording to semantic externalism when S uses a referring term, she re-
fers to whatever typically causes her uses of that term (in the case of 
BIV—sense impressions as of being a BIV, according to Brueckner and 
many other commentators, but not real “brains” and “vats”). 
The exact role and type of externalism used in the argument has 
been disputed, however. Kallestrup (Goldberg 2016: 53) argues that 
the causal constraint on reference needed in Putnam’s proof is actu-
ally quite weak and consistent with semantic internalism: “semantic 
externalists are no better placed than semantic internalists in terms of 
being able to appeal to Putnam’s proof as a semantic response to epis-
temological skepticism.” Grundmann (Goldberg 2016: 90–110) on the 
other hand compares the New Evil Demon (NED) intuition—one can 
have justifi ed beliefs about the world even if one is living in a demon 
world with the Old Evil Demon (OED) intuition (BIV, dream). Accord-
ing to the latter one cannot possess justifi ed beliefs about the world 
unless one is able to rule out relevant skeptical hypotheses. There was 
always a strong tendency to regard the NED intuition as evidence for 
the internalism, but Grudmann argues that the NED intuition does not 
provide a compelling argument for mentalism but is in fact compatible 
with the view that justifi cation requires reliability. The BVA assumes 
the view that the individuation conditions of mental content depend, in 
part, on external or relational properties of the subject’s environment. 
If these connections are constructed reliabilistically and reliability is 
a necessary condition for justifi cation this would vindicate the crucial 
role of externalism in Putnam’s argument, or so it seems.
An interesting new development in this area is explored by Ber-
necker (Goldberg 2016: 54–72). Whereas content externalism locates 
mental states inside the head or body of an individual, the hypothesis 
of extended mind claims that the role of the physical or social environ-
ment is not restricted to the determination of mental content. Mental 
states are not only externally individuated but also externally located 
states. Just as the brain in a vat forms a coupled system with the su-
percomputer that feeds it all of its sensory-input signals, the supercom-
puter forms a coupled system with the evil scientist who programs it 
(Goldberg, ed. 2016: 64). But the scientist presumably speaks a “nor-
mally” referring language, and since the brain in a vat should count 
as an extension of the evil scientist’s mind it too, can, after all refer to 
trees and vats and so on. When content externalism is combined with 
the extended mind hypothesis it is robbed of its anti-skeptical power 
according to Bernecker.
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The topic of externalism, self-knowledge and reliabilism in the form 
of sensitivity principle is also discussed by Becker (Goldberg 2016: 111–
127). The crucial belief “I am a not BIV” is sensitive (and thus fulfi lls 
a necessary condition for knowledge), for if it were false I would not 
believe that I am. “I would have some other belief, such as that I am 
not some specifi c state type of some particular automated machinery” 
(Goldberg 2016: 116). But unless I know that my terms are referring 
and my thoughts are about brains and vats, I don’t know whether the 
belief that I express by ‘I am not a BIV’ is that I am not a BIV. The ap-
peal to sensitivity has not explained how I could know that the skepti-
cal hypothesis is false. Becker’s result is largely negative—sensitivity 
adds nothing to the standard view and standard discussion.
Standard discussion views the BIV scenario primarily as a vehicle 
for Cartesian angst (cf. Button in Goldberg 2016: 142). The worry that 
it generates is that appearances might be radically deceptive, so that 
(almost) all of our beliefs are false. In particular, my utterances of ‘I 
am a BIV’ are false if I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), according 
to Brueckner (recall step 4 in the disjunctive argument above). The 
vat-English truth conditions of ‘I am a BIV’ are not satisfi ed because 
of deception (I am not fed experiences about my “reality”, representing 
me to be a disembodied BIV). But I think that deception, implying false 
beliefs, is, strictly speaking, not essential at all. On the assumption of 
externalism BIVs lack conceptual resources to even think about the 
reality of their situation. The Evil Demon scenario has undergone an 
important historical transformation.
We should follow the suggestion by Miščević (Miščević 2016) and 
explore the diachronic developments in a long-term life of a thought 
experiment. The BIV scenario lies at the intersection of “trails” of two 
thought experiments, the Cartesian Evil Demon scenario and Put-
nam’s Twin Earth scenario (Oscar on the Twin Earth, not being in 
causal contact with Earthly H2O, does not refer to water). Deception is 
of course crucial in the Cartesian scenario, but when the two scenarios 
are combined all the anti-skeptical work is done by semantic external-
ism—in order for our words to refer to a particular kind of thing, it is 
necessary for our uses of the term to be connected in an appropriate 
way with things of that kind. Recall Putnam’s initial analogy: an ant is 
crawling on a patch of sand and as it crawls, it traces a line in the sand 
which ends up looking like a caricature of Winston Churchill (Putnam 
1981: 1). The Putnamian intuition is that the caricature does not refer 
to or represent Churchill, because the presuppositions of successful ref-
erence are not fulfi lled. This suggests that the main problem with BIV 
mental states is not a cruel deception, but lack of proper connection.
Suppose we take seriously the parenthetical part of Putnam’s own 
comment (Putnam 1981: 15): “the sentence ‘we are brains-in-a-vat’ says 
something false (if it says anything).” We should then reconsider the 
anti-skeptical argument not on the assumption that “We are not brains 
in a vat” is false, rather, the preconditions for its being true or false 
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are not fulfi lled (I try to do this in Šuster 2016). To repeat, I think that 
Putnam’s externalism is the basis of his reply to BIV skepticism: no 
false beliefs because no real beliefs (thoughts) at all (and not because 
some demonic machinery is feeding us false impressions). Still, a vast 
majority of authors in the collection take the crucial role of massively 
false beliefs for granted (with Folina as an exception).
I will return to the assessment of the Putnam-style refutation of 
radical skepticism later (Part II: “Epistemology”). Let me jump to the 
third and the largest section, “Metaphysics”, covering Putnam’s model-
theoretic argument (MTA) against metaphysical realism (MR) and its 
connections with the brain in vat argument (BVA). It is a vexed issue 
how to reconstruct interrelations between MTA, BVA and MR. Even 
Putnam himself is (characteristically) ambiguous. According to his own 
report (Putnam 1992: 362):
I gave a seminar at Princeton in the late seventies at which I presented and 
defended my model-theoretic arguments. David Lewis, who was present, 
commented that “there must be something wrong somewhere”—because, if 
my arguments were right, it followed that we could not be brains in a vat! 
So there is a direct connection between the BIV scenario and the mod-
el-theoretic argument, MTA implies BVA? But there are other reports, 
for instance by Brueckner, who thinks that BVA should be sharply dis-
tinguished from the model-theoretic argument against metaphysical 
realism (1986: 149, footnote 2):
Putnam has indicated (in conversation) that it was in fact his intention to 
construct an argument in chapter 1 [of Putnam 1981, i.e. BVA, D.Š.] quite 
different from the model-theoretic argument of the later chapters. 
Guyer (1992: 100) noticed that some commentators are committed to 
the assumption that the views of a great philosopher like Kant must 
possess a profound unity that can be brought out by a sympathetic 
interpretation. A different interpretation is defended by Guyer himself 
and the so called “patchwork” theorists: Kant’s greatness lies more in 
some of his particular analyses and arguments and in his recognition of 
the complexity of the connections among them than in his pretensions 
to systematicity. I think that something similar is true of Putnam and 
his interpreters. Button and Sundell belong to the camp of unifi ers, 
Sher is clearly a patchwork theorist, Douven and Marino are less ex-
plicit, but probably also accept just a juxtaposition, not an amalgama-
tion of BVA and MTA.
Let me start with Putnam himself. The fi rst chapter of Reason, 
Truth and History is dedicated to the BIV scenario, and model the-
oretic results are briefl y mentioned (Putnam 1981: 7), when he says 
about the BVA argument: “It fi rst occurred to me when I was thinking 
about a theorem in modern logic, the ‘Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem’, 
and I suddenly saw a connection between this theorem and some argu-
ments in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.” The prime locus 
of Wittgensteinian themes seems to be the private language argument: 
mental representations are not magically connected with what they 
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represent. On the other hand, when discussing the problem of (anti)
realism later in the book, the possibility of a BIV scenario is one of 
the dividing issues between the camps. According to the perspective of 
metaphysical realism:
… the world consists of some fi xed totality of mind-independent objects. 
There is exactly one true and complete description of ‘the way the world 
is’. Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or 
thought-signs and external things and sets of things. I shall call this per-
spective the externalist perspective, because its favorite point of view is a 
God’s Eye point of view (Putnam 1981: 49).
On the internalist perspective, defended by Putnam, the question of 
what objects does the world consist of is a question that it only makes 
sense to ask within a theory or description. ‘Truth’, in an internalist 
view, is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability. A ‘Brain in a 
Vat World’ is then only a story and not a possible world at all (Putnam 
1981: 50):
For from whose point of view is the story being told? Evidently not from 
the point of view of any of the sentient creatures in the world. Nor from the 
point of view of any observer in another world who interacts with this world; 
for a ‘world’ by defi nition includes everything that interacts in any way with 
the things it contains. ... . So the supposition that there could be a world in 
which all sentient beings are Brains in a Vat presupposes from the outset a 
God’s Eye view of truth, or, more accurately, a No Eye view of truth — truth 
as independent of observers altogether.
For a metaphysical realist the truth of a theory consists in its corre-
sponding to the world as it is in itself, so the BIV scenario cannot be 
dismissed. This establishes an elegant connection between MR and 
BIV in the form of modus tollens, in the version of Sundell (Goldberg 
2016: 229):
1) If metaphysical realism is true, then pervasive error is a coher-
ent possibility.
2) But pervasive error is not a coherent possibility.
3) So metaphysical realism is false.
The fi rst premise is based on the non-epistemic notion of truth inher-
ent to MR: even an empirically adequate theory—a theory that is pre-
dictively accurate and that satisfi es any theoretical virtue one may 
like—may still be false (cf. Douven in Goldberg 2016: 175). In Putnam’s 
earlier writings the BIV scenario sometimes really fi gured as an illus-
tration of the possibility of pervasive error. According to MR (Putnam 
1977: 485)
THE WORLD is supposed to be independent of any particular representa-
tion we have of it—indeed, it is held that we might be unable to represent 
THE WORLD correctly at all (e.g., we might all be “brains in a vat”, the 
metaphysical realist tells us).
The most important consequence of metaphysical realism is that truth is 
supposed to be radically non-epistemic—we might be “brains in a vat” and 
so the theory that is “ideal” from the point of view of operational utility, 
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inner beauty and elegance, “plausibility”, simplicity, “conservatism”, etc., 
might be false.
But Putnam (1981) does not justify premise (2) above with the impossibil-
ity of BIV demonstrated by BVA. The main work of justifying the impos-
sibility of pervasive error is done by MTA, an epistemically ideal theory is 
guaranteed to be true, according to Putnam. As noted by Sundell:
For an ideal theory to be false, it must be the case that the theory fails to 
correspond to what the world is like on the correct interpretation of that 
theory. But the MTA shows that there is no way to privilege such an inter-
pretation as correct. The theory is guaranteed to be true on some interpre-
tation, and nothing from inside or outside of the theory can show that that 
interpretation is the wrong one (Goldberg 2016: 229).
But what I fi nd much more doubtful is that for Sundell “... the anti-re-
alist application of the BVA is the same as the anti-realist application 
of the MTA. Both arguments attack the coherence of pervasive error” 
(Goldberg 2016: 234). Putnam’s aim in his 1981 was to refute three “so-
lutions” to the puzzle of what it is that determines reference and meta-
physical realism is not the main target (cf. De Gaynesford 2011: 579). 
The main problem is the relation of correspondence on which truth 
and reference depend for MR. Putnam argues that MR cannot offer a 
satisfactory account of determinate referential relations between the 
words and the things. If one is in BIV the relation of independent cor-
respondence characteristic for MR is not available, so, given MR com-
mitments, the scenario is paradoxical, a puzzler (Putnam 1981: 51). 
As he notes in his earlier writings, “Suppose we (and all other sentient 
beings) are and always were “brains in a vat”. Then how does it come 
about that our word ‘vat’ refers to noumenal vats and not to vats in the 
image?” (Putnam 1977: 487).
We can agree with Sher (Goldberg 2016: 208) that the MTA argu-
ment shows that (i) we cannot theoretically determine the reference of 
our words, and that, as a result, (ii) we must renounce the correspon-
dence theory of truth and robust realism. The BVA argument, on the 
other hand, shows, that (iii) we cannot truly believe that we are BIVs, 
and that (iv) Cartesian skepticism is thus undermined. MTA is the 
main weapon against MR and BVA seems to be a different, juxtaposed 
issue. Sher is also critical with respect to Putnam’s results—she thinks 
that the meta-logical considerations that lead Putnam to conclude (i) 
are irrelevant to a robust realist/correspondence account of reference (I 
tend to agree).
The other two “patchwork” theorists, Douven and Marino, do not 
have much to say about BVA, but they are also critical with respect 
to the prospects of MTA. According to Douven MTA against realism is 
based on two assumptions:
(CT) Truth is a matter of correspondence to the facts.
(SN) Semantics is an empirical science like any other.
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At the time when the MTA was conceived, it was common to think that 
a semantics could not be scientifi cally acceptable if its key concepts 
could not be accounted for in strictly physicalist terms. But (CT) is no 
longer the only game in the town, specialists working on truth are now-
adays more inclined toward some version of defl ationism. Douven ar-
gues, convincingly, that semantics can be pursued in a scientifi c spirit 
without necessarily being part of a reductionist–physicalist research 
program. Thus MTA is no longer supported (Goldberg, ed. 2016: 189). 
Marino discusses the question how does the model-theoretic argu-
ment look from the point of view of contemporary naturalism. She also 
stresses that naturalistic forms of disquotationalism diverge from or 
challenge Putnam’s own understanding of reference and truth. Her 
prime example of a contemporary naturalistic philosopher is “the Sec-
ond Philosopher”, from Maddy (2007). The whole idea of metaphysical 
realism is somehow misguided from the perspective of modern natural-
ism and, at least from the contemporary perspective, Putnam seems to 
be fi ghting a straw man:
... the rejection of metaphysical realism seems signifi cant to Putnam only 
because of his desire for an account that will, from outside the use of our 
methods, support and justify those methods—a desire the Second Philoso-
pher does not share (Marino in Goldberg 2016: 200).
On the other pole of interpretation the main defender of unifi cation is 
Button. He sees a deep connection between Putnam’s thoughts on BIVs, 
on Skolem’s Paradox, and on permutations (also called the “cats and 
cherries” argument from the Appendix in Putnam 1981: 217–218). The 
last two are based on model-theoretical results but Button unites them 
all in the form of the BIV-style argument. All types of skepticism—
permutation-skepticism (the worry is that our words do not refer as 
they are intuitively supposed to), skolemism (the worry here is that we 
cannot tell whether there really are uncountable sets, or merely seem 
to be1) and BIV skepticism are self-refuting when considered as types 
of internal skepticism. Internal skepticism is based on assumptions 
which we ourselves hold, the skeptic raises an antinomy from within 
our own worldview. The lynchpin of all of the anti-skeptical arguments 
is self-refutation, if the skeptical scenario were actual, then we would 
be unable to articulate this (Goldberg 2016: 153). 
Button elegantly develops the template in the form of the BIV-style 
argument, where the core principle is the principle of disquotation. Ac-
cording to Brueckner’s original assessment (cf. Pritchard and Ranalli 
in Goldberg 2016: 78) one can get the proper anti-skeptical conclusion 
1 Let me note a disturbing typo, the argument against the skolemist is stated as 
(Goldberg 2016: 143):
 (1S) A smallworlder’s word ‘countable’ applies only to countable (H) sets.
 (2S) My word ‘countable’ applies only to countable (H) sets.
 (3S) So: I am not a smallworlder.
But surely, (2S) should be “My word ‘countable’ does not apply only to countable 
(H) sets.”
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“It is not the case that I am a BIV” from “My utterances of ‘I am a BIV’ 
are false” only with the help of the additional disquotation principle:
(T) My utterances of ‘I am a BIV’ are true iff I am a BIV.
This looks question-begging. I am entitled to (T) only if I am entitled to 
assume that I am a normal human being speaking English rather than 
a BIV speaking referentially defective vat-English. Since I do not know 
whether I am speaking English or vat-English, I do not know whether the 
truth conditions of my utterances of ‘I am a BIV’ are disquotational ones 
or not. Still, Button, Ebbs, Sundell and in this collection also Brueckner 
(Goldberg 2016: 21–22), they all defend our knowledge of the semantics 
of our own language (i.e. our language disquotes and we are entitled to 
(T)). According to Ebbs (Goldberg 2016: 27–36) the goal of the argument 
is not to show, by strictly a priori methods, that we are not always brains 
in vats. Rather, we always start “relying on already established beliefs 
and inferences, and applying our best methods for re-evaluating particu-
lar beliefs and inferences and arriving at new ones” (Goldberg 2016: 31). 
The point of the BVA is to transform our understanding of the statement 
that we are not always brains in vats. If we presuppose substantive be-
liefs that suffi ce for minimal competence in the use of the words, we may 
infer that the disquotational premise (T) is true.
This is still very cautious. In the opening article of the collection 
Brueckner now defends Putnam’s reasoning in the form of the Simple 
Argument (Goldberg 2016: 21–22):
(1) If I am a BIV, then my tokens of ‘tree’ do not refer to trees.
(2) My word ‘tree’ refers to trees.
(3) So, I am not a BIV.
How does he refute his own earlier criticism? How is (2) justifi ed? 
Brueckner now claims that whichever language is the one that I am 
speaking (English or vat-English), my language disquotes. This is li-
censed by my knowledge of the semantics of my own language (Gold-
berg 2016: 24). 
Button is the most resolute of the three—for him the falsity of dis-
quotation is genuinely unrepresentable. He considers the following ver-
sion of BVA (Goldberg 2016: 135):
(1B) A BIV’s word ‘brain’ does not refer to brains.
(2B) My word ‘brain’ refers to brains.
(3B) So: I am not a BIV.
Premise (1B) is justifi ed by semantic externalism and premise (2B) by 
defending disquotation in the mother-tongue. To understand, talk or 
even just present the BIV scenario, we need to rely on disquotation, 
so the skeptic cannot even raise doubts about (2B)—“premise (2B) is 
implicitly required by the BIV skeptic herself in the very formulation 
of her skeptical challenge …, to deny (2B) is self-refuting” (Button in 
Goldberg 2016: 137). Without relying upon disquotation the skeptic 
cannot even present her worry that everyone is a BIV.
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For Button a simple argumentative template, based on self-refuta-
tion (as exemplifi ed by the BVA), shows us how to defeat skolemism, 
permutation-skepticism and BIV skepticism and, in so doing, how to 
overthrow certain philosophical pictures. The process that unifi es MTA 
and BVA is the following (Goldberg 2016: 153):
Step 1. Isolate a particular philosophical picture.
Step 2. Observe that some skeptical challenge is unanswerable, given 
 this picture.
Step 3. Show that the skepticism in question is actually self-refuting 
 (or reliant on magic).
Step 4. Conclude by rejecting the original picture as incoherent 
 (or reliant on magic).
Let me start by noting that this unifying process is very general, it 
could easily fi t, for instance, Berkeley’s critique of materialism as a 
particular philosophical picture (given materialism the skeptical chal-
lenge is unanswerable, but skepticism is self-refuting, because in order 
to conceive of mind-independent objects, we must ourselves be conceiv-
ing of them.) A road to idealism as is often suspected by Devitt in his 
comments on Putnam? Not necessarily, the process could perhaps also 
fi t some of Wittgenstein’s strategies, the point is, rather, that there 
need not be any specifi c unity in Putnam’s discussions of brains in vats, 
of Skolem’s paradox, and of cats and cherries (that all and only those 
three arguments fi t the procedure diagnosed by Button). My sympa-
thies remain with the patchwork theorists but as it is clear from the 
quotes above, in the late seventies there were several lines of thoughts 
in Putnam’s writings, sometimes separate, sometimes intersecting and 
Button does a great job in his attempt to provide a unifi ed picture (also 
in his very elegant and “user-friendly” presentation of skolemism and 
the permutation argument).
Next, is it really impossible to make sense of the statement that 
we are not always brains in vats being false? It seems to me that our 
knowledge of semantic features (disquotation) of our own language 
cannot be apriori—it is an established semantic fact that even in plain 
vernacular English containing empty names (and perhaps vague ex-
pressions) disquotation fails. Suppose we take seriously the idea that 
sentences uttered by BIVs are neither true nor false, because the pre-
conditions for their having a truth value are not fulfi lled. The disquota-
tion scheme for sentences is just the Tarski’s schema:
(T) “P” is true if and only if P
If truth-value gaps are admitted, then this principle is no longer valid. 
Sentences with empty terms (‘this dagger’ when used by someone under 
a hallucination), lack the disquotational properties. Yet we still seem to 
be linguistically competent and possess some level of understanding of 
our words even if disquotation fails. “Quasi-understanding” perhaps, so 
that BIV’s mental states lacking normal referential properties do not 
count as real thoughts but “quasi-thoughts” only. Still, BIV’s are not 
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like ants, the scenario makes sense only if they are relevantly similar 
to us—capable of engaging in cognitive mental activities. In the vat I 
cannot really think “I am a brain in a vat” since I cannot think about 
real world brains and real world vats. But, as Folina (Goldberg 2016: 
172) rightly notices, it does not follow that I cannot have thoughts that 
are epistemically identical to the BIV thought or nearly so. Just recall 
the discussions about narrow content—no matter how different the in-
dividual’s environment were, the belief would have the same content it 
actually does. Horgan, Tienson and Graham, for instance, defend the 
notion of narrow phenomenology—according to Cartesian intuitions, 
as they name them, one intuitively judges that the BIV’s mental life 
exactly matches one’s own, the BIV has numerous beliefs, both percep-
tual and non-perceptual, that exactly match one’s own “normal” beliefs 
(Horgan et al. 2004: 297). Can we really exclude this possibility on the 
grounds of self-refutation? Contrary to Ebbs I fi nd the worry of the 
question-begging nature of the BVA quite persuasive (Brueckner 1986: 
160, quoted by Ebbs in Goldberg 2016: 36):
I can conclude from this [argument] that I am a normal human being rather 
than a BIV—and thereby lay the skeptical problem to rest—only if I can as-
sume that I mean by “I may be a BIV” what normal human beings mean by 
it. But I am entitled to that assumption only if I am entitled to assume that 
I am a normal human being speaking English rather than a BIV speaking 
vat-English. This must be shown by an anti-skeptical argument, not as-
sumed in advance.
The challenge has now really changed—the original worry was the Car-
tesian possibility of having massively false beliefs, the “new” skeptical 
worry is how do we know that our terms refer, that the preconditions 
of our having real thoughts are fulfi lled. Or, in words of Folina, our in-
ability to think of or about the exact conditions under which we may 
be deluded implies that the skeptical thought lacks specifi city, it does 
not make it incoherent (Goldberg 2016: 172–173). Similar critical voices 
are represented by Pritchard and Ranalli (Goldberg 2016: 75–89). They 
provide a list of critiques of the anti-skeptical potential of BVA, end-
ing on a pessimistic note—the BIV hypothesis is simply a template for 
making vivid what might be our actual epistemic predicament. “Prima 
facie it’s hard to see why some of those possible truths [truths we can-
not conceive] are not skeptical, representing our epistemic predicament 
in ways that we cannot conceive” (Goldberg 2016: 89). And Sher adds 
(Goldberg 2016: 225): “… if there are conditions under which BIVs could 
fi gure out some things about the world, are we as different from them 
as Putnam thinks we are? Is it absolutely irrational to entertain the 
possibility that we are them, that we are at least a little bit like them?”
Let me try to summarize the problem of the relationships between 
BVA, MTA and MR from the perspective of the BIV scenario. Skepti-
cism was traditionally a road to anti-realism (a total denial of knowl-
edge is diffi cult to sustain, so the “reality” cannot be something that 
transcends our cognitive abilities) and externalism, in general, was 
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supposed to be realistic in spirit. One would therefore expect the anti-
skeptical argument such as BVA to support realism, but Putnam is 
more subtle. According to his intersecting lines of thinking only inter-
nal realism can deliver the anti-skeptical goods. Metaphysical realism 
is always in the grip of the “mind the gap” warning: even a rationally 
optimal or ‘ideal’ theory of the world could be mistaken. Putnam argues 
that this is not possible, but his main weapon against MR is the model-
theoretic argument. Metaphysical realism commits itself to claim that 
uniquely determinate referential relations exist between what we say 
(and think) and the world, and MTA challenges this claim. This sug-
gests that we should interpret the BIV scenario as a referential puzzle 
for MR and not as a way of showing that pervasive error is incoherent 
and in this way opposing the view that a theory which gives every ap-
pearance of being true might really be radically false.
BVA, on the other hand, is primarily an anti-skeptical argument, 
but a Putnam-style refutation of radical skepticism looks like a small-
pox vaccine which prevents the severest and the rarest form of small-
pox only. The BVA excludes just those bad scenarios “cooked up to be 
vulnerable to the semantical reply” (Christensen 1993: 302), but one 
remaining is enough to “kill” your knowledge (DeRose 2000: 128). Even 
on its own terms Putnam’s reasoning remains unconvincing as an an-
tidote for skepticism—most of the vast literature has been critical and 
my presentation might be biased in this respect since the collection is 
quite balanced between those who assess the anti-skeptical potential of 
the argument positively (Brueckner, Ebbs, Button, Sundell) and those 
who are more doubtful (Pritchard and Ranalli, Folina, Sher). The con-
nections between MTA and BVA might be tenuous (to loose to justify 
six articles out of fourteen altogether in any case), and perhaps some 
space should be dedicated to the historical dimension of BIV instead 
(this type of thought experiment did not start with Putnam in 1981). 
Still this is an excellent collection of papers provoking and extending 
discussion in various directions, the long-term life of the brain in a vat 
thought experiment seems to be guaranteed.
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